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Abstract. Despite the improved accuracy of deep neural networks, the discov-
ery of adversarial examples has raised serious safety concerns. Most existing ap-
proaches for crafting adversarial examples necessitate some knowledge (archi-
tecture, parameters, etc) of the network at hand. In this paper, we focus on image
classifiers and propose a feature-guided black-box approach to test the safety of
deep neural networks that requires no such knowledge. Our algorithm employs
object detection techniques such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform)
to extract features from an image. These features are converted into a mutable
saliency distribution, where high probability is assigned to pixels that affect the
composition of the image with respect to the human visual system. We formulate
the crafting of adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based stochastic game,
where the first player’s objective is to minimise the distance to an adversarial
example by manipulating the features, and the second player can be cooperative,
adversarial, or random. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can con-
verge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally
minimal adversarial image. For Lipschitz networks, we also identify conditions
that provide safety guarantees that no adversarial examples exist. Using Monte
Carlo tree search we gradually explore the game state space to search for ad-
versarial examples. Our experiments show that, despite the black-box setting,
manipulations guided by a perception-based saliency distribution are competitive
with state-of-the-art methods that rely on white-box saliency matrices or sophis-
ticated optimization procedures. Finally, we show how our method can be used
to evaluate robustness of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as
traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs or networks, for simplicity) have been developed for a
variety of tasks, including malware detection [12], abnormal network activity detec-
tion [34], and self-driving cars [6,5,35]. A classification network N can be used as a
decision-making algorithm: given an input α, it suggests a decision N(α) among a
set of possible decisions. While the accuracy of neural networks has greatly improved,
matching the cognitive ability of humans [19], they are susceptible to adversarial ex-
amples [4,36]. An adversarial example is an input which, though initially classified
correctly, is misclassified after a minor, perhaps imperceptible, perturbation. Adver-
sarial examples pose challenges for self-driving cars, where neural network solutions
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have been proposed for tasks such as end-to-end steering [6], road segmentation [5],
and traffic sign classification [35]. In the context of steering and road segmentation, an
adversarial example may cause a car to steer off the road or drive into barriers, and
misclassifying traffic signs may cause a vehicle to drive into oncoming traffic. Fig. 1
shows an image of a traffic light correctly classified by a state-of-the-art network which
is then misclassified after only a few pixels have been changed. Though somewhat arti-
ficial, since in practice the controller would rely on additional sensor input whem mak-
ing a decision, such cases strongly suggest that, before deployment in safety-critical
tasks, DNNs resilience (or robustness) to adversarial examples must be strengthened.
Fig. 1: An adversarial example for the YOLO object
recognition network.
A number of approaches have
been proposed to search for
adversarial examples (see Re-
lated Work). They are based on
computing the gradients [13],
along which a heuristic search
moves; computing a Jacobian-
based saliency map [30], based
on which pixels are selected to
be changed; transforming the
existence of adversarial exam-
ples into an optimisation prob-
lem [9], on which an optimisa-
tion algorithm can be applied;
transforming the existence of
adversarial examples into a con-
straint solving problem [16], on which a constraint solver can be applied; or discretising
the neighbourhood of a point and searching it exhaustively in a layer-by-layer man-
ner [15]. All these approaches assume some knowledge about the network, e.g., the
architecture or the parameters, which can vary as the network continuously learns and
adapts to new data, and, with a few exceptions [29] that access the penultimate layer,
do not explore the feature maps of the networks.
In this paper, we propose a feature-guided approach to test the resilience of image
classifier networks against adversarial examples. While convolutional neural networks
(CNN) have been successful in classification tasks, their feature extraction capability
is not well understood [40]. The discovery of adversarial examples has called into
question CNN’s ability to robustly handle input with diverse structural and composi-
tional elements. On the other hand, state-of-the-art feature extraction methods are able
to deterministically and efficiently extract structural elements of an image regardless of
scale, rotation or transformation. A key observation of this paper is that feature extrac-
tion methods enable us to identify elements of an image which are most vulnerable to a
visual system such as a CNN.
Leveraging knowledge of the human perception system, existing object detection
techniques detect instances of semantic objects of a certain class (such as animals,
buildings, or cars) in digital images and videos by identifying their features. We use the
scale-invariant feature transform approach, or SIFT [23], to detect features, which is
achieved with no knowledge of the network in a black-box manner. Using the SIFT fea-
tures, whose number is much smaller than the number of pixels, we represent the image
as a two-dimensional Gaussian mixture model. This reduction in dimensionality allows
us to efficiently target the exploration at salient features, similarly to human perception.
We formulate the process of crafting adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based
stochastic game, where player I selects features and player II then selects pixels within
the selected features and a manipulation instruction. After both players have made their
choices, the image is modified according to the manipulation instruction, and the game
continues. While player I aims to minimise the distance to an adversarial example,
player II can be cooperative, adversarial, or nature who samples the pixels according
to the Gaussian mixture model. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can
converge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally min-
imal adversarial image. We also consider safety guarantees for Lipschitz networks and
identify conditions to ensure that no adversarial examples exist.
We implement a software package4, in which a Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS)
algorithm is employed to find asymptotically optimal strategies for both players, with
player II being a cooperator. The algorithm is anytime, meaning that it can be ter-
minated with time-out bounds provided by the user and, when terminated, it returns
the best strategies it has for both players. The experiments on networks trained on
benchmark datasets such as MNIST [20] and CIFAR10 [1] show that, even without the
knowledge of the network and using relatively little time (1 minute for every image),
the algorithm can already achieve competitive performance against existing adversarial
example crafting algorithms. We also experiment on several state-of-the-art networks,
including the winner of the Nexar traffic light challenge [28], a real-time object de-
tection system YOLO, and VGG16 [3] for ImageNet competition, where, surprisingly,
we show that the algorithm can return adversarial examples even with very limited re-
sources (e.g., running time of less than a second), including that in Fig. 1 from YOLO.
Further, since the SIFT method is scale and rotation invariant, we can counter claims in
the recent paper [24] that adversarial examples are not invariant to changes in scale or
angle in the physical domain.
Our software package is well suited to safety testing and decision support for DNNs
in safety-critical applications. First, the MCTS algorithm can be used offline to evalu-
ate the network’s robustness against adversarial examples on a given set of images.
The asymptotic optimal strategy achievable by MCTS algorithm enables a theoretical
guarantee of safety, i.e., the network is safe when the algorithm cannot find adversar-
ial examples. The algorithm is guaranteed to terminate, but this may be impractical, so
we provide an alternative termination criterion. Second, the MCTS algorithm, in view
of its time efficiency, has the potential to be deployed on-board for real-time decision
support.
An extended version of the paper, which includes more additional explanations and
experimental results, is available from [39].
4 The software package and all high-resolution figures used in the paper are available from
https://github.com/matthewwicker/SafeCV
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a network with a set C of classes. Given an input α and a class c ∈ C,
we use N(α, c) to denote the confidence (expressed as a probability value obtained
from normalising the score) of N believing that α is in class c. Moreover, we write
N(α) = arg maxc∈C N(α, c) for the class into which N classifies α. For our discus-
sion of image classification networks, the input domain D is a vector space, which in
most cases can be represented as IRw×h×ch[0,255] , where w, h, ch are the width, height, and
number of channels of an image, respectively, and we let P0 = w × h × ch be the set
of input dimensions. In the following, we may refer to an element in w × h as a pixel
and an element in P0 as a dimension. We remark that dimensions are normalised as
real values in [0, 1]. Image classifiers employ a distance function to compare images.
Ideally, such a distance should reflect perceptual similarity between images, compara-
ble to human perception. However, in practice Lk distances are used instead, typically
L0, L1 (Manhattan distance), L2 (Euclidean distance), and L∞ (Chebyshev distance).
We also work with Lk distances but emphasise that our method can be adapted to other
distances. In the following, we write ||α1 − α2||k with k ≥ 0 for the distance between
two images α1 and α2 with respect to the Lk measurement.
Given an image α, a distance measure Lk, and a distance d, we define η(α, k, d) =
{α′ | ||α′ − α||k ≤ d} as the set of points whose distance to α is no greater than d
with respect to Lk. Next we define adversarial examples, as well as what we mean by
targeted and non-targeted safety.
Definition 1. Given an input α ∈ D, a distance measure Lk for some k ≥ 0, and a
distance d, an adversarial example α′ of class c 6= N(α) is such that α′ ∈ η(α, k, d),
N(α) 6= N(α′), and N(α′) = c. Moreover, we write advN,k,d(α, c) for the set of
adversarial examples of class c and let advN,k,d(α) =
⋃
c∈C,c 6=N(α) advN,k,d(α, c). A
targeted safety of class c is defined as advN,k,d(α, c) = ∅, and a non-targeted safety is
defined as advN,k,d(α) = ∅.
Feature Extraction The Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) algorithm [23], a
reliable technique for exhuming features from an image, makes object localization and
tracking possible without the use of neural networks. Generally, the SIFT algorithm
proceeds through the following steps: scale-space extrema detection (detecting rela-
tively darker or lighter areas in the image), keypoint localization (determining the exact
position of these areas), and keypoint descriptor assignment (understanding the context
of the image w.r.t its local area). Human perception of an image or an object can be
reasonably represented as a set of features (referred to as keypoints in SIFT) of differ-
ent sizes and response strengths, see [38] and Appendix of [39] for more detail. Let
Λ(α) be a set of features of the image α such that each feature λ ∈ Λ(α) is a tuple
(λx, λy, λs, λr), where (λx, λy) is the coordinate of the feature in the image, λs is the
size of the feature, and λr is the response strength of the feature. The SIFT procedures
implemented in standard libraries such as OpenCV may return more information which
we do not use.
On their own, keypoints are not guaranteed to involve every pixel in the image,
and in order to ensure a comprehensive and flexible safety analysis, we utilize these
Fig. 2: Illustration of the transformation of an image into a saliency distribution. (a) The
original image α, provided by ImageNet. (b) The image marked with relevant keypoints
Λ(α). (c) The heatmap of the Gaussian mixture model G(Λ(α)).
keypoints as a basis for a Guassian mixture model. Fig. 2 shows the original image (a)
and this image annotated with keypoints (b).
Gaussian Mixture Model Given an image α and its set Λ(α) of keypoints, we define
for λi ∈ Λ(α) a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution Gi such that, for pixel (px, py),
we have
Gi,x = 1√
2piλ2i,s
exp
(−(px − λi,x)2
2λ2i,s
) Gi,y = 1√
2piλ2i,s
exp
(−(py − λi,y)2
2λ2i,s
)
(1)
where the variance is the size λi,s of the keypoint and the mean is its location (λi,x, λi,y).
To complete the model, we define a set of weights Φ = {φi}i∈{1,2,...,k} such that
k = |Λ(α)| and φi = λi,r/
∑k
j=0 λj,r. Then, we can construct a Gaussian mixture
model G by combining the distribution components with the weights as coefficients,
i.e., Gx =
∏k
i=1 φi×Gi,x and Gy =
∏k
i=1 φi×Gi,y . The two-dimensional distributions
are discrete and separable and therefore their realization is tractable and independent,
which improves efficiency of computation. Let G(Λ(α)) be the obtained Gaussian mix-
ture model from Λ(α), and G be the set of Gaussian mixture models. In Fig. 2 we
illustrate the transformation of an image into a saliency distribution.
Pixel Manipulation We now define the operations that we consider for manipulating
images. We write α(x, y, z) for the value of the z-channel (typically RGB or grey-scale
values) of the pixel positioned at (x, y) on the image α. Let I = {+,−} be a set of
manipulation instructions and τ be a positive real number representing the manipulation
magnitude, then we can define pixel manipulations δX,i : D → D for X a subset of
input pixels and i ∈ I:
δX,i(α)(x, y, z) =
α(x, y, z) + τ, if (x, y) ∈ X and i = +α(x, y, z)− τ, if (x, y) ∈ X and i = −
α(x, y, z) otherwise
for all pixels (x, y) and channels z ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that if the values are bounded, e.g.,
[0, 1], δX,i(α)(x, y, z) needs to be restricted to be within the bounds. For simplicity, in
our experiments and comparisons we allow a manipulation to choose either the upper
bound or the lower bound with respect to the instruction i. For example, in Fig. 1, the
actual manipulation considered is to make the manipulated dimensions choose value 1.
3 Safety Against Manipulations
Recall that every image represents a point in the input vector space D. Most existing
investigations of the safety (or robustness) of DNNs focus on optimising the movement
of a point along the gradient direction of some function obtained from the network
(see Related Work for more detail). Therefore, these approaches rely on the knowl-
edge about the DNN. Arguably, this reliance holds also for the black-box approach
proposed in [29], which uses a new surrogate network trained on the data sampled from
the original network. Furthermore, the current understanding about the transferability
of adversarial examples (i.e., an adversarial example found for a network can also serve
as an adversarial example for another network, trained on different data) are all based
on empirical experiments [29]. The conflict between the understanding of transferabil-
ity and existing approaches to crafting adversarial examples can be gleaned from an
observation made in [21] that gradient directions of different models are orthogonal to
each other. A reasonable interpretation is that transferable adversarial examples, if they
exist, do not rely on the gradient direction suggested by a network but instead may be
specific to the input.
In this paper, we propose a feature-guided approach which, instead of using the
gradient direction as the guide for optimisation, relies on searching fro adversarial ex-
amples by targeting and manipulating image features as recognised by human percep-
tion capability. We extract features using SIFT, which is a reasonable proxy for human
perception and enables dimensionality reduction through the Gaussian mixture repre-
sentation (see [32]). Our method needs neither the knowledge about the network nor
the necessity to massively sample the network for data to train a new network, and is
therefore a black-box approach.
Game-based Approach We formulate the search for adversarial examples as a two-
player turn-based stochastic game, where player I selects features and player II then
selects pixels within the selected features and a manipulation instruction. While player
I aims to minimise the distance to an adversarial example, player II can be cooperative,
adversarial, or nature who samples the pixels according to the Gaussian mixture model.
To give more intuition for feature-guided search, in Appendix of [39] we demonstrate
how the distribution of the Gaussian mixture model representation evolves for different
adversarial examples.
We define the objective function in terms of the Lk distance and view the distance
to an adversarial example as a measure of its severity. Note that the sets advN,k,d(α, c)
and advN,k,d(α) of adversarial examples can be infinite.
Definition 2. Among all adversarial examples in the set advN,k,d(α, c) (or advN,k,d(α)),
find α′ with the minimum distance to the original image α:
arg min
α′
{sevα(α′) | α′ ∈ advN,k,d(α, c)(or advN,k,d(α))} (2)
where sevα(α′) = ||α− α′||k is the severity of the adversarial example α′ against the
original image α.
We remark that the choice of Lk will affect perceptual similarity, see Appendix of [39].
Crafting Adversarial Examples as a Two-Player Turn-Based Game Assume two
players I and II. Let M(α, k, d) = (S ∪ (S × Λ(α)), s0, {Ta}a∈{I,II}, L) be a game
model, where S is a set of game states belonging to player I such that each state repre-
sents an image in η(α, k, d), and S × Λ(α) is a set of game states belonging to player
II where Λ(α) is a set of features (keypoints) of image α. We write α(s) for the im-
age associated to the state s ∈ S. s0 ∈ S is the initial game state such that α(s0) is
the original image α. The transition relation TI : S × Λ(α) → S × Λ(α) is defined as
TI(s, λ) = (s, λ), and transition relation TII : (S×Λ(α))×P(P0)×I → S is defined as
TII((s, λ), X, i) = δX,i(α(s)), where δX,i is a pixel manipulation defined in Section 2.
Intuitively, on every game state s ∈ S, player I will choose a keypoint λ, and, in re-
sponse to this, player II will choose a pair (X, i), where X is a set of input dimensions
and i is a manipulation instruction. The labelling function L : S∪(S×Λ(α))→ C×G
assigns to each state s or (s, λ) a class N(α(s)) and a two-dimensional Gaussian mix-
ture model G(Λ(α(s))).
A path (or game play) of the game model is a sequence s1u1s2u2... of game states
such that, for all k ≥ 1, we have uk = TI(sk, λk) for some feature λk and sk+1 =
TII((sk, λk), Xk, ik) for some (Xk, ik). Let last(ρ) be the last state of a finite path ρ
and PathFa be the set of finite paths such that last(ρ) belongs to player a ∈ {I, II}.
A stochastic strategy σI : PathFI → D(Λ(α)) of player I maps each finite paths to
a distribution over the next actions, and similarly for σII : PathFII → D(P(P0) × I)
for player II. We call σ = (σI, σII) a strategy profile. In this section, we only discuss
targeted safety for a given target class c (see Definition 1). All the notations and results
can be easily adapted to work with non-targeted safety.
In the following, we define a reward R(σ, ρ) for a given strategy profile σ =
(σI, σII) and a finite path ρ ∈
⋃
a∈{I,II} Path
F
a . The idea of the reward is to accu-
mulate a measure of severity of the adversarial example found over a path. Note that,
given σ, the game becomes a fully probabilistic system. Let α′ρ = α(last(ρ)) be the
image associated with the last state of the path ρ. We write t(ρ) for the expression
N(α′ρ) = c ∨ ||α′ρ − α||k > d, representing that the path has reached a state whose
associated image either is in the target class c or lies outside the region η(α, k, d). The
path ρ can be terminated whenever t(ρ) is satisfiable. It is not hard to see that, due
to the constraints in Definition 1, every infinite path has a finite prefix which can be
terminated. Then we define the reward function R(σ, ρ) =
1/sevα(α
′
ρ) if t(ρ) and ρ ∈ PathFI∑
λ∈Λ(α) σI(ρ)(λ) ·R(σ, ρTI(last(ρ), λ)) if ¬t(ρ) and ρ ∈ PathFI∑
(X,i)∈P(P0)×I σII(ρ)(X, i) ·R(σ, ρTII(last(ρ), X, i)) if ρ ∈ PathFII
where σI(ρ)(λ) is the probability of selecting λ on ρ by player I, and σII(ρ)(X, i) is
the probability of selecting (X, i) based on ρ by player II. We note that a path only
terminates on player I states.
Intuitively, if an adversarial example is found then the reward assigned is the inverse
of severity (minimal distance), and otherwise it is the weighted summation of the re-
wards if its children. Thus, a strategy σI to maximise the reward will need to minimise
the severity sevα(α′ρ), the objective of the problem defined in Definition 2.
Definition 3. The goal of the game is for player I to choose a strategy σI to maximise
the rewardR((σI, σII), s0) of the initial state s0, based on the strategy σII of the player
II, i.e.,
arg max
σI
optσIIR((σI, σII), s0). (3)
where option optσII can be maxσII , minσII , or natσII , according to which player II
acts as a cooperator, an adversary, or nature who samples the distribution G(Λ(α)) for
pixels and randomly chooses the manipulation instruction.
A strategy σ is called deterministic if σ(ρ) is a Dirac distribution, and is called
memoryless if σ(ρ) = σ(last(ρ)) for all finite paths ρ. We have the following result.
Theorem 1. Deterministic and memoryless strategies suffice for player I, when optσII ∈{maxσII ,minσII , natσII}.
Complexity of the Problem As a by-product of Theorem 1, the theoretical complex-
ity of the problem (i.e., determining whether advN,k,d(α, c) = ∅) is in PTIME, with
respect to the size of the game model M(α, k, d). However, even if we only consider
finite paths (and therefore a finite system), the number of states (and therefore the size
of the system) is O(|P0|h) for h the length of the longest finite path of the system with-
out a terminating state. While the precise size of O(|P0|h) is dependent on the prob-
lem (including the image α and the difficulty of crafting an adversarial example), it is
roughly O(50000100) for the images used in the ImageNet competition and O(100020)
for smaller images such as CIFAR10 and MNIST. This is beyond the capability of ex-
isting approaches for exact or -approximate computation of probability (e.g., reduction
to linear programming, value iteration, and policy iteration, etc) that are used in proba-
bilistic verification.
4 Monte Carlo Tree Search for Asymptotically Optimal Strategy
In this section, we present an approach based on Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) [10]
to find an optimal strategy asymptotically. We also we show that the optimal strategy,
if achieved, represents the best adversarial example with respect to the objective in
Definition 2, under some conditions.
We first consider the case of optσII = maxσII . An MCTS algorithm, whose pseudo-
code is presented in Algorithm 1, gradually expands a partial game tree by sampling the
strategy space of the model M(α, k, d). With the upper confidence bound (UCB) [17]
as the exploration-exploitation tradeoff, MCTS has a theoretical guarantee that it con-
verges to optimal solution when the game tree is fully explored. The algorithm mainly
follows the standard MCTS procedure, with a few adaptations. We use two termination
conditions tc1 and tc2 to control the pace of the algorithm. More specifically, tc1 con-
trols whether the entire procedure should be terminated, and tc2 controls when a move
should be made. The terminating conditions can be, e.g., bounds on the number of iter-
ations, etc. On the partial tree, every node maintains a pair (r, n), which represents the
accumulated reward r and the number of visits n, respectively. The selection proce-
dure travels from the root to a leaf according to an exploration-exploitation balance, i.e.,
UCB [17]. After expanding the leaf node to have its children added to the partial tree,
we call Simulation to run simulation on every child node. A simulation on a new node
is a play of the game from node until it terminates. Players act randomly during the
simulation. Every simulation terminates when reaching a terminated node α′, on which
a reward 1/sevα(α′) can be computed. This reward is then backpropagated from the
new child node through its ancestors until reaching the root. Every time a new reward
v is backpropogated through a node, we update its associated pair to (r + v, n + 1).
The bestChild(root) returns the child of root which has the highest value of r/n. The
Algorithm 1 Monte Carlo Tree Search for optσII = maxσII
1: Input: A game model M(α, k, d), two termination conditions tc1 and tc2, a target class c
2: Output: An adversarial example α′
3: procedure MCTS(M(α, k, d), tc1, tc2, c)
4: root← s0
5: While(¬tc1):
6: While(¬tc2):
7: leaf ← selection(root)
8: newnodes← expansion(M(α, k, d), leaf)
9: for node in newnodes:
10: v ← Simulation(M(α, k, d), node, c)
11: backPropogation(node, v)
12: root← bestChild(root)
13: return root
other two cases are similar except for the choice of the next move (i.e., Line 12). In-
stead of choosing the best child, a child is chosen by sampling G(Λ(α)) for the case of
optσII = natσII , and the worst child is chosen for the case of optσII = minσII . We
remark the game is not zero-sum when optσII ∈ {natσII ,maxσII}.
Severity Interval from the Game Assume that we have fixed termination conditions
tc1 and tc2 and target class c. Given an option optσII for player II, we have an
MCTS algorithm to compute an adversarial example α′. Let sev(M(α, k, d), optσII)
be sevα(α′), where α′ is the returned adversarial example by running Algorithm 1 over
the inputs M(α, k, d), tc1, tc2, c for a certain optσII . Then there exists a severity inter-
val SI(α, k, d) with respect to the role of player II:
[sev(M(α, k, d),max
σII
), sev(M(α, k, d),min
σII
)]. (4)
Moreover, we have that sev(M(α, k, d), natσII) ∈ SI(α, k, d).
Safety Guarantee via Optimal Strategy Recall that τ , a positive real number, is the
manipulation magnitude used in pixel manipulations. An image α′ ∈ η(α, k, d) is a
τ -grid image if for all dimensions p ∈ P0 we have |α′(p) − α(p)| = n ∗ τ for some
n ≥ 0. Let G(α, k, d) be the set of τ -grid images in η(α, k, d). First of all, we have the
following conclusion for the case when player II is cooperative.
Theorem 2. Let α′ ∈ η(α, k, d) be any τ -grid image such that α′ ∈ advN,k,d(α, c),
where c is the targeted class. Then we have that sevα(α′) ≥ sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII).
Intuitively, the theorem says that the algorithm can find the optimal adversarial ex-
ample from the set of τ -grid images. The idea of the proof is to show that every τ -grid
image can be reached by some game play. In the following, we show that, if the net-
work is Lipschitz continuous, we need only consider τ -grid images when τ is small
enough. Then, together with the above theorem, we can conclude that our algorithm is
both sound and complete.
Further, we say that an image α1 ∈ η(α, k, d) is a misclassification aggregator with
respect to a number β > 0 if, for any α2 ∈ η(α1, 1, β), we have that N(α2) 6= N(α)
implies N(α1) 6= N(α). Intuitively, if a misclassification aggregator α1 with respect
to β is classified correctly then all input images in η(α1, 1, β) are classified correctly.
We remark that the region η(α1, 1, β) is defined with respect to the L1 metric, but
can also be defined using Lk′ , some k′, without affecting the results if η(α, k, d) ⊆⋃
α1∈G(α,k,d) η(α1, k
′, τ/2). Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If all τ -grid images are misclassification aggregators with respect to τ/2,
and sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) > d, then advN,k,d(α, c) = ∅.
Note that sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) > d means that none of the τ -images in η(α, k, d)
is an adversarial example. The theorem suggests that, to achieve a complete safety
verification, one may gradually decrease τ until either sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) ≤ d,
in which case we claim the network is unsafe, or the condition that all τ -grid images
are misclassification aggregators with respect to τ/2 is satisfiable, in which case we
claim the network is safe. In the following, we discuss how to decide the largest τ for
a Lipschitz network, in order to satisfy that condition and therefore achieve a complete
verification using our approach.
Definition 4. Network N is a Lipschitz network with respect to the distance Lk and
a constant ~ > 0 if, for all α, α′ ∈ D, we have |N(α′, N(α)) − N(α,N(α))| <
~ · ||α′ − α||k.
Note that all networks whose inputs are bounded, including all image classification
networks we studied, are Lipschitz networks. Specifically, it is shown in [33] that most
known types of layers, including fully-connected, convolutional, ReLU, maxpooling,
sigmoid, softmax, etc., are Lipschitz continuous. Moreover, we let ` be the minimum
confidence gap for a class change, i.e.,
` = min{|N(α′, N(α))−N(α,N(α))| | α, α′ ∈ D, N(α′) 6= N(α)}.
The value of ` is in [0, 1], dependent on the network, and can be estimated by examining
all input examples α′ in the training and test data sets, or computed with provable
guarantees by reachability analysis [33]. The following theorem can be seen as an
instantiation of Theorem 3 by using Lipschitz continuity with τ ≤ 2`~ to implement the
misclassification aggregator.
Theorem 4. Let N be a Lipschitz network with respect to L1 and a constant ~. Then,
when τ ≤ 2`~ and sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) > d, we have that advN,k,d(α, c) = ∅.
1/-convergence Because we are working with a finite game, MCTS is guaranteed to
converge when the game tree is fully expanded. In the worst case, it may take a very
long time to converge. In practice, we can work with 1/-convergence by letting the
program terminate when the current best adversarial example has not been improved by
finding a less severe one for d1/e iterations, where  > 0 is a small real number.
5 Experimental Results
For our experiments, we let player II be a cooperator, and its move (X, i) is such
that for all (x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2) ∈ X we have x1 = x2 and y1 = y2, i.e., one
pixel (including 3 dimensions for color images or 1 dimension for grey-scale images)
is changed for every move. When running simulations (Line 10 of Algorithm 1), we
let σI(λ) = λr/
∑
λ∈Λ(α) λr for all keypoints λ ∈ Λ(α) and optσII = natσII . That
is, player I follows a stochastic strategy to choose a keypoint according to its response
strength and player II is nature. In this section, we compare our method with existing
approaches, show convergence of the MCTS algorithm on limited runs, evaluate safety-
critical networks trained on traffic light images, and counter-claim a recent statement
regarding adversarial examples in physical domains.
Comparison with Existing Approaches We compare our approach to two state-of-the-
art methods on two image classification networks, trained on the well known bench-
mark datasets MNIST and CIFAR10. The MNIST image dataset contains images of
size 28 × 28 and one channel and the network is trained with the source code given
in [2]. The trained network is of medium size with 600,810 real-valued parameters, and
achieves state-of-the-art accuracy, exceeding 99%. It has 12 layers, within which there
are 2 convolutional layers, as well as layers such as ReLU, dropout, fully-connected
layers and a softmax layer. The CIFAR10 dataset contains small images, 32× 32, with
three channels, and the network is trained with the source code from [1] for more than
12 hours. The trained network has 1,250,858 real-valued parameters and includes con-
volutional layers, ReLU layers, max-pooling layers, dropout layers, fully-connected
layers, and a softmax layer. For both networks, the images are preprocessed to make
the value of each dimension lie within the bound [0, 1]. We randomly select 1000 im-
ages {αi}i∈{1..1000} from both datasets for non-targeted safety testing. The numbers
in Table 1 are average distances defined as 11000 ·
∑1000
i=1 ||αi − α′i||0, where α′i is the
adversarial image of αi returned by the algorithm. Table 1 gives a comparison with the
other two approaches (CW [9] and JSMA [30]). The numbers for CW and JSMA are
taken from [9] 5, where additional optimisations have been conducted over the original
5 For CW, the L0 distance in [9] counts the number of changed pixels, while for the others the
L0 distance counts the number of changed dimensions. Therefore, the number 5.8 in Table 1 is
not precise, and should be between 5.8 and 17.4, because colour images have three channels.
JSMA. According to [30], the original JSMA has an average distance of 40 for MNIST.
Our experiments are conducted by setting the termination conditions tc1 = 20s and
L0 CW (L0 algorithm) Game (timeout = 1m) JSMA-F JSMA-Z
MNIST 8.5 14.1 17 20
CIFAR10 5.8 9 25 20
Table 1: CW vs. Game (this paper) vs. JSMA
tc2 = 60s for every image. Note that JSMA needs several minutes to handle an image,
and CW is 10 times slower than JSMA [9]. From the table, we can see that, already
in a limited computation time, our game-based approach can achieve a significant mar-
gin over optimised JSMA, which is based on saliency distributions, although it is not
able to beat the optimisation-based approach CW. We also mention that, in [15], the
un-optimised JSMA produces adversarial examples with smaller average L2 distance
than FGSM [13] and DLV on its single-path algorithm [15]. Appendix of [39] provide
illustrative examples exhibiting the manipulations that the three algorithms performed
on the images.
Convergence in Limited Runs To demonstrate convergence of our algorithm, we plot
the evolution of three variables related to the adversarial severity sevα(α′) against the
number of iterations. The variable best (in blue color) is the smallest severity found so
far. The variable current (in orange) is the severity returned in the current iteration. The
variablewindow (in green) is the average severity returned in the past 10 iterations. The
blue and orange plots may overlap because we let the algorithm return the best example
when it fails to find an adversarial example in some iteration. The experiments are
terminated with 1/-convergence of different  value such as 0.1 or 0.05. The green plot
getting closer to the other two provides empirical evidence of convergence. In Fig. 3 we
Fig. 3: (a) Image of a two classified as a seven with 70% confidence and (b) the demon-
stration of convergence. (c) Image of a six classified as a five with 50% confidence and
(d) the demonstration of convergence.
show that two MNIST images converge over fewer than 50 iterations on manipulations
of 2 pixels, and we have confirmed that they represent optimal strategies of the players.
We also work with other state-of-the-art networks such as the VGG16 network [3] from
the ImageNet competition. Examples of convergence are provided in Appendix of [39].
Evaluating Safety-Critical Networks We explore the possibility of applying our game-
based approach to support real-time decision making and testing, for which the algo-
rithm needs to be highly efficient, requiring only seconds to execute a task.
We apply our method to a network used for classifying traffic light images collected
from dashboard cameras. The Nexar traffic light challenge [28] made over eighteen
thousand dashboard camera images publicly available. Each image is labeled either
green, if the traffic light appearing in the image is green, or red, if the traffic light ap-
pearing in the image is red, or null if there is no traffic light appearing in the image. We
test the winner of the challenge which scored an accuracy above 90% [8]. Despite each
input being 37632-dimensional (112x112x3), our algorithm reports that the manipula-
tion of an average of 4.85 dimensions changes the network classification. Each image
was processed by the algorithm in 0.303 seconds (which includes time to read and write
images), i.e., 304 seconds are taken to test all 1000 images. We illustrate the results of
Fig. 4: Adversarial examples generated on Nexar data demonstrate a lack of robust-
ness. (a) Green light classified as red with confidence 56% after one pixel change. (b)
Green light classified as red with confidence 76% after one pixel change. (c) Red light
classified as green with 90% confidence after one pixel change.
our analysis of the network in Fig. 4. Though the images are easy for humans to clas-
sify, only one pixel change causes the network to make potentially disastrous decisions,
particularly for the case of red light misclassified as green. To explore this particular
situation in greater depth, we use a targeted safety MCTS procedure on the same 1000
images, aiming to manipulate images into green. We do not consider images which
are already classified as green. Of the remaining 500 images, our algorithm is able to
change all image classifications to green with worryingly low severities, namely an av-
erage L0 of 3.23. On average, this targeted procedure returns an adversarial example in
0.21 second per image. Appendix A provides some other examples.
Fig. 5: (Left) Adversarial examples in physical domain remain adversarial at multiple
angles. Top images classified correctly as traffic lights, bottom images classified incor-
rectly as either ovens, TV screens, or microwaves. (Right) Adversarial examples in the
physical domain remain adversarial at multiple scales. Top images correctly classified
as traffic lights, bottom images classified incorrectly as ovens or microwaves (with the
center light being misclassified as a pizza in the bottom right instance).
Counter-claim to Statements in [24] A recent paper [24] argued that, under specific
circumstances, there is no need to worry about adversarial examples because they are
not invariant to changes in scale or angle in the physical domain. Our SIFT-based ap-
proach, which is inherently scale and rotationally invariant, can easily counter-claim
such statements. To demonstrate this, we conducted similar tests to [24]. We set up the
YOLO network, took pictures of a few traffic lights in Oxford, United Kingdom, and
generated adversarial examples on these images. For the adversarial example shown in
Fig. 1, we print and photograph it at several different angles and scales to test whether
it remains misclassified. The results are shown in Fig. 5. In [24] it is suggested that
realistic camera movements – those which change the angle and distance of the viewer
– reduce the phenomenon of adversarial examples to a curiosity rather than a safety
concern. Here, we show that our adversarial examples, which are predicated on scale
and rotationally invariant methods, defeat these claims.
6 Related Works
We review works concerning the safety (and robustness) of deep neural networks. In-
stead of trying to be complete, we aim to only cover those directly related.
White-box heuristic approaches. In [37], Szegedy et. al. find a targeted adversarial
example by running the L-BFGS algorithm, which minimises the L2 distance between
the images while maintaining the misclassification. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[13], a refinement of L-BFGS, takes as inputs the parameters θ of the model, the input
α to the model, and the target label y, and computes a linearized version of the cost
function with respect to θ to obtain a manipulation direction. After the manipulation
direction is fixed, a small constant value τ is taken as the magnitude of the manipulation.
Carlini and Wagner [9] adapt the optimisation problem proposed in [37] to obtain a set
of optimisation problems for L0, L2, and L∞ attacks. They claim better performance
than FGSM and Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) with their L2 attack,
in which for every pixel xi a new real-valued variable wi is introduced and then the
optimisation is conducted by letting xi move along the gradient direction of tanh(wi).
Different from the optimisation approaches, the JSMA [30] uses a loss function to create
a “saliency map” of the image which indicates the importance of each pixel on the
network’s decision. A greedy algorithm is used to gradually modify the most important
pixels. In [26], an iterative application of an optimisation approach (such as [37]) is
conducted on a set of images one by one to get an accumulated manipulation, which is
expected to make a number of inputs misclassified. [25] replaces the softmax layer in a
deep network with a multiclass SVM and then finds adversarial examples by performing
a gradient computation.
White-box verification approaches. Compared with heuristic search approaches, the
verification approaches aim to provide guarantees on the safety of DNNs. An early
verification approach [31] encodes the entire network as a set of constraints. The con-
straints can then be solved with a SAT solver. [16] improves on [31] by handling the
ReLU activation functions. The Simplex method for linear programming is extended to
work with the piecewise linear ReLU functions that cannot be expressed using linear
programming. The approach can scale up to networks with 300 ReLU nodes. In recent
work [14] the input vector space is partitioned using clustering and then the method
of [16] is used to check the individual partitions. DLV [15] uses multi-path search and
layer-by-layer refinement to exhaustively explore a finite region of the vector spaces
associated with the input layer or the hidden layers, and scales to work with state-of-
the-art networks such as VGG16.
Black-box algorithms. The methods in [29] evaluate a network by generating a syn-
thetic data set, training a surrogate model, and then applying white box detection tech-
niques on the model. [27] randomly searches the vector space around the input image
for changes which will cause a misclassification. It shows that in some instances this
method is efficient and able to indicate where salient areas of the image exist.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present a novel feature-guided black-box algorithm for evaluating the
resilience of deep neural networks against adversarial examples. Our algorithm em-
ploys the SIFT method for feature extraction, provides a theoretical safety guarantee
under certain restrictions, and is very efficient, opening up the possibility of deploy-
ment in real-time decision support. We develop a software package and demonstrate its
applicability on a variety of state-of-the-art networks and benchmarks. While we have
detected many instabilities in state-of-the-art networks, we have not yet found a network
that is safe. Future works include comparison with the Bayesian inference method for
identifying adversarial examples [11].
Acknowledgements Kwiatkowska is supported by EPSRC Mobile Autonomy Pro-
gramme Grant (EP/M019918/1). Xiaowei gratefully acknowledges NVIDIA Corpora-
tion for its support with the donation of the Titan Xp GPU, and is partially supported
by NSFC (no. 61772232)
References
1. CIFAR10 model for Keras. https://github.com/fchollet/keras/blob/master/examples/cifar10 cnn.py.
2. MNIST CNN network. https://github.com/fchollet/keras/blob/master/examples/mnist cnn.py.
3. VGG16 model for Keras. https://gist.github.com/baraldilorenzo/07d7802847aaad0a35d3.
4. Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Srndic, Pavel Laskov,
Giorgio Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time. In
ECML/PKDD 2013, pages 387–402, 2013.
5. Sebastian Bittel, Vitali Kaiser, Marvin Teichmann, and Martin Thoma. Pixel-wise segmen-
tation of street with neural networks. CoRR, abs/1511.00513, 2015.
6. Mariusz Bojarski, Davide Del Testa, Daniel Dworakowski, Bernhard Firner, Beat Flepp,
Prasoon Goyal, Lawrence D. Jackel, Mathew Monfort, Urs Muller, Jiakai Zhang, Xin
Zhang, Jake Zhao, and Karol Zieba. End to end learning for self-driving cars. CoRR,
abs/1604.07316, 2016.
7. G. Bradski. The OpenCV Library. Dr. Dobb’s Journal of Software Tools, 2000.
8. Alon Burg. Deep Learning Traffic Lights model for Nexar Competition.
https://github.com/burgalon/deep-learning-traffic-lights.
9. Nicholas Carlini and David A. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural net-
works. CoRR, abs/1608.04644, 2016.
10. G.M.J.B. Chaslot, M.H.M. Winands, J.W.H.M. Uiterwijk, H.J. van den Herik, and B. Bouzy.
Progressive strategies for monte-carlo tree search. New Mathematics and Natural Computa-
tion, 4(3):343–359, 2008.
11. Piotr Dabkowski and Yarin Gal. Real time image saliency for black box classifiers. CoRR,
abs/1705.07857, 2017.
12. George Dahl, Jack W. Stokes, Li Deng, and Dong Yu. Large-scale malware classification us-
ing random projections and neural networks. In Proceedings IEEE Conference on Acoustics,
Speech, and Signal Processing. IEEE SPS, May 2013.
13. Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing ad-
versarial examples. CoRR, abs/1412.6572, 2014.
14. Divya Gopinath, Guy Katz, Corina S. Pasareanu, and Clark Barrett. Deepsafe: A data-driven
approach for checking adversarial robustness in neural networks. CoRR, abs/1710.00486,
2017.
15. Xiaowei Huang, Marta Kwiatkowska, Sen Wang, and Min Wu. Safety verification of deep
neural networks. In CAV 2017, pages 3–29, 2017.
16. Guy Katz, Clark Barrett, David Dill, Kyle Julian, and Mykel Kochenderfer. Reluplex: An
efficient smt solver for verifying deep neural networks. In CAV 2017, to appear, 2017.
17. Levente Kocsis and Csaba Szepesva´ri. Bandit based monte-carlo planning. In European
Conference on Machine Learning (ECML2006), 2006.
18. Jan J. Koenderink. The structure of images. Biological Cybernetics, 50(5):363–370, Aug
1984.
19. Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Geoffrey Hinton. Deep learning. Nature, 521:436–444,
2015.
20. Yann LeCun and Corinna Cortes. MNIST handwritten digit database. 2010.
21. Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song. Delving into transferable adversarial
examples and black-box attacks. In ICLR2017, 2017.
22. David G. Lowe. Object recognition from local scale-invariant features. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Computer Vision-Volume 2 - Volume 2, ICCV ’99, pages 1150–,
Washington, DC, USA, 1999. IEEE Computer Society.
23. David G. Lowe. Distinctive image features from scale-invariant keypoints. Int. J. Comput.
Vision, 60(2):91–110, November 2004.
24. J. Lu, H. Sibai, E. Fabry, and D. Forsyth. NO Need to Worry about Adversarial Examples in
Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicles. ArXiv e-prints, July 2017.
25. Marco Melis, Ambra Demontis, Battista Biggio, Gavin Brown, Giorgio Fumera, and Fabio
Roli. Is deep learning safe for robot vision? adversarial examples against the icub humanoid.
CoRR, abs/1708.06939, 2017.
26. Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Uni-
versal adversarial perturbations. CoRR, abs/1610.08401, 2016.
27. Nina Narodytska and Shiva Prasad Kasiviswanathan. Simple black-box adversarial pertur-
bations for deep networks. CoRR, abs/1612.06299, 2016.
28. Nexar. Challenge: Using deep learning for traffic light recognition.
https://www.getnexar.com/challenge-1.
29. Nicolas Papernot, Patrick D. McDaniel, Ian J. Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z. Berkay Celik,
and Ananthram Swami. Practical black-box attacks against deep learning systems using
adversarial examples. CoRR, abs/1602.02697, 2016.
30. Nicolas Papernot, Patrick D. McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrikson, Z. Berkay Celik,
and Ananthram Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. CoRR,
abs/1511.07528, 2015.
31. Luca Pulina and Armando Tacchella. An abstraction-refinement approach to verification of
artificial neural networks. In CAV 2010, pages 243–257, 2010.
32. Douglas A. Reynolds. Gaussian mixture models. In Encyclopedia of Biometrics, 2009.
33. Wenjie Ruan, Xiaowei Huang, and Marta Kwiatkowska. Reachability analysis of deep neural
networks with provable guarantees. Submitted, 2018.
34. Jake Ryan, Meng-Jang Lin, and Risto Miikkulainen. Intrusion detection with neural net-
works. In Michael I. Jordan, Michael J. Kearns, and Sara A. Solla, editors, Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 10, pages 943–949. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998.
35. Pierre Sermanet and Yann Lecun. Traffic sign recognition with multi-scale convolutional
networks. The 2011 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 2011.
36. Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian
Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR-2014), 2014.
37. Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan,
Ian J. Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. CoRR,
abs/1312.6199, 2013.
38. Richard Szeliski. Computer Vision: Algorithms and Applications. Springer, 2010.
39. Matthew Wicker, Xiaowei Huang, and Marta Kwiatkowska. Feature-guided black-box safety
testing of deep neural networks. CoRR, abs/1710.07859, 2017.
40. Jason Yosinski, Jeff Clune, Thomas Fuchs Anh Nguyen, , and Hod Lipson. Understanding
neural networks through deep visualization. In 2015 ICML workshop on Deep learning,
2015.
Appendix
The appendix provides further details of our method and experimental results, as well
as additional background information, and is organised as follows. In Section A, we
provide additional empirical results of our algorithm, while in Section B we give proofs
of the theorems in Section 4. Section C includes the architectures of the networks used
in our experiments. SIFT-based feature detection techniques are explained in Section D
and the intuition for using such techniques in safety testing is described in Section E.
Section F provides information about the Nexar challenge and an overview of the
MCTS algorithm is given in Section G. Finally, Section H includes a discussion of
the suitability of using Lk distance measures in safety testing and verification and Sec-
tion I of the feasibility of generalising our algorithm to DNNs for tasks other than image
classification.
A Empirical Results of the MCTS Algorithm
In this section, we provide empirical results showing the performance and convergence
of our MCTS algorithm when working on networks trained on MNIST, CIFAR10,
Nexar Challenge, and ImageNet datasets.
MNIST A few examples showing the convergence of our algorithm on MNIST network
are given in Figure 6.
CIFAR10 Figure 7 shows the results of a comparison of our algorithm with two state-
of-the-art algorithms based on heuristic search, where the CW-L0 attack algorithm is
based on gradient descent and the JSMA algorithm on the Jacobian saliency map.
Nexar Challenge Fig. 8 gives some examples of applying our algorithm to targeted
safety. We also show in Fig. 9 that, for many inputs, MCTS is able to find an optimal
strategy (a single-pixel misclassification) in only eight simulations (about 0.3 seconds).
ImageNet We work with state-of-the-art networks for the imageNet challenge, includ-
ing the VGG16 network [3]. Plots in Figure 10 and Figure 11 show clear convergence
of our algorithm.
B Proofs of Theorems
In this section, we provide proofs to the two theorems in Section 4.
Theorem 3. If all τ -grid images are misclassification aggregators with respect to τ/2,
and sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) > d, then advN,k,d(α, c) = ∅.
Proof. First, we need to show that η(α, k, d) ⊆ ⋃α1∈G(α,k,d) η(α1, 1, τ/2). This can
be obtained by the definitions of η(α1, 1, τ/2) and η(α, k, d).
Fig. 6: Further empirical evidence of MCTS strategy convergence. (a) Another optimal
convergence example, one modified to an eight with confidence 55%, and (b) plot of
MCTS performance over 50 simulations (minimum severity, rolling average severity
and severity per iteration). (c) An image of a zero classified as a five with confidence
48% after six pixel manipulations and (d) MCTS performance on this image. (e) Image
of a seven classified as an eight with 47% confidence after six pixel manipulations and
(f) MCTS performance on this image. (g) Image of a four predicted as an eight with 50%
confidence after four pixel manipulations and (h) MCTS performance on this image.
Game CW JSMA
automobile L0 = 12 airplane L0 = 15 airplane L0 = 16 airplane
frog L0 = 3 airplane L0 = 18 airplane L0 = 40 airplane
dog L0 = 3 bird L0 = 12 bird L0 = 10 bird
deer L0 = 6 airplane L0 = 6 airplane L0 = 24 airplane
Fig. 7: Adversarial examples by Game (this paper) vs. CW vs. JSMA for CIFAR-10
networks.
Now assume that advN,k,d(α, c) 6= ∅. Then there must exist an image α′ such that
α′ ∈ advN,k,d(α, c). Because all τ -grid images are misclassification aggregators with
respect to τ/2, there must exist a τ -grid image α′′ such that α′′ ∈ advN,k,d(α, c). By
Theorem 2, we have sevα(α′′) ≥ sev(M(α, p, d, τ),maxσII). By the hypothesis that
sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) > d, we have sevα(α
′′) > d, which is impossible because
α′′ ∈ advN,k,d(α, c) ⊂ η(α, k, d). 
Theorem 4. Let N be a Lipschitz network with respect to L1 and a constant ~. Then,
when τ ≤ 2`~ and sev(M(α, k, d),maxσII) > d, we have that advN,k,d(α, c) = ∅.
Proof. We need to show that τ ≤ 2`~ implies that all τ -grid images are misclassification
aggregators with respect to τ/2. First of all, by the definition of Lipschitz network, we
have |N(α2, N(α2)) − N(α1, N(α2))| < ~ · ||α2 − α1||1. Then, by the definition of
`, we have ||α2 − α1||1 > `/h when N(α2) 6= N(α1). Second, we notice that, the
statement that all τ -grid images are misclassification aggregators with respect to τ/2 is
equivalent to saying that, for any τ -grid image α1 such that N(α1) = N(α), we have
that, for any α2, N(α2) 6= N(α1) implies that ||α2 − α1||1 > τ/2. Finally, we notice
that ||α2 − α1||1 > τ/2 holds when ||α2 − α1||1 > `/h and τ ≤ 2`~ . 
Fig. 8: Targeted adversarial examples on Nexar illustrate safety concerns. (a) Red light
classified as green with 68% confidence after one pixel change. (b) Red light classified
as green with 95% confidence after one pixel change. (c) Red light classified as green
with confidence 78% after one pixel change.
Fig. 9: Convergence to an optimal strategy on Nexar traffic light images. (a) An image
of a red light manipulated into a green light after a single pixel change and the plot
of convergence over eight simulations (b). (c) An image of a green light manipulated
to a red light after a single pixel manipulation and (d) its convergence plot over eight
simulations.
Fig. 10: Adversarial examples generated on the VGG16 architecture trained on Ima-
geNet data. (a) Image of a great white shark classified as a galeocerdo cuvieri with
confidence 42% after 113 manipulations and (b) the demonstration of convergence over
20 simulations. (b) An image of a crutch classified as bakery after 143 manipulations
and (d) the demonstration of convergence over 20 simulations.
Fig. 11: Further empirical evidence of MCTS strategy convergence on state-of-the-art
VGG16 network. (a) Image of an ice lolipop predicted as a nipple with 30% confidence
after 241 pixel manipulations and (b) MCTS performance on this image. (c) A pinwheel
predicted as a radio telescope with confidence 21% after 287 pixel manipulations and
(d) MCTS performance on this image.
C Network Architectures in the Experiments
This section provides the details of the architectures and training parameters of the
networks we work with in our experiments. This includes MNIST networks in Table 2,
CIFAR10 network in Table 3, VGG16 network for ImageNet dataset in Table 4, and the
champion network for Nexar challenge in Table 5.
Layer Type Layer Size Parameter SGD
Conv + ReLU 3x3x32 Learning Rate 0.1
Conv + ReLU 3x3x32 Momentum 0.9
Max Pooling 2x2 Delay Rate -
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Dropout 0.5
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Batch Size 128
Max Pooling 2x2 Epochs 50
Dense + ReLU 200
Dense + ReLU 200
Softmax + ReLU 10
Table 2: MNIST LeNet Architecture and training parameters used in [9] and [30].
Layer Type Layer Size (or value) Parameter SGD
Conv + ReLU 3x3x32 Learning Rate 0.1
Conv + ReLU 3x3x32 Momentum 0.9
Max Pooling 2x2 Delay Rate -
Dropout 0.25
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Dropout 0.5
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Batch Size 128
Max Pooling 2x2 Epochs 50
Dropout 0.25
Dense + ReLU 512
Dropout 0.5
Softmax + ReLU 10
Table 3: Architecture and training parameters used in for CIFAR10 dataset.
Layer Type Layer Size Parameter SGD
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Learning Rate 0.1
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Decay 1e-9
Max Pooling 2x2 Momentum 0.9
Conv + ReLU 3x3x128 Nesterov 1
Conv + ReLU 3x3x128 Loss Categorical Crossentropy
Max Pooling 2x2
Conv + ReLU 3x3x256
Conv + ReLU 3x3x256
Conv + ReLU 3x3x256
Max Pooling 2x2
Conv + ReLU 3x3x512
Conv + ReLU 3x3x512
Conv + ReLU 3x3x512
Max Pooling 2x2
Conv + ReLU 3x3x512
Conv + ReLU 3x3x512
Conv + ReLU 3x3x512
Max Pooling 2x2
Dense 4096
Dropout 0.5
Dense 4096
Dropout 0.5
Dense + Softmax 1000
Table 4: Architecture and training parameters of VGG16 for imageNet dataset.
Layer Type Layer Size Parameter Adam
Conv + ReLU 3x3x16 Learning Rate 3e-4
Max Pooling 3x3 Beta 1 0.9
Conv + ReLU 3x3x32 Beta 2 0.999
Max Pooling 3x3 Fuzz Factor 1e-08
Conv + ReLU 3x3x64 Decay 0.0
Max Pooling 2x2
Dense 128
Softmax 3
Table 5: Architecture and training parameters for a winning entry in the Nexar Traffic
Light challenge [28].
D Feature Detection Techniques
In this section, we give a brief review of a state-of-the-art computer vision algorithm
which will be used in our black-box approach. The Scale Invariant Feature Transform
(SIFT) algorithm [23], a reliable technique for exhuming features from an image, makes
object localization and tracking possible without the use of neural networks. Generally,
the SIFT algorithm proceeds in a few steps: scale-space extrema detection (detecting
relatively darker or lighter areas in the image), keypoint localization (determining the
exact position of these areas), and keypoint descriptor assignment (understanding the
context of the image w.r.t its local area). Below, we give a summary of the SIFT algo-
rithm, and focus on the output and features which will be used in our algorithms.
Scale-Space Extrema Detection In [18], it is shown that the only appropriate way to
parameterize the resolution of an image without the generation of spurious details (i.e.
details which are not inherent in the image, but generated by the method of parameteri-
zation) is given by the two-dimensional Gaussian kernel. Lowe [23] uses this to detect
extrema in a given image α by observing the local pixel-value extrema at different
scales. Formally, the kth scale of an image α is calculated6 as follows:
S(x, y, kσ) = G(x, y, kσ) ∗ α(x, y) (5)
where x, y represent the Euclidean coordinates of a pixel, * is the convolution operator,
and G(x, y, σ) is the two-dimensional Gaussian kernel given by:
G(x, y, σ) =
1
2piσ2
exp(−(x2 + y2)/2σ2). (6)
Essentially this parametrization allows us to change σ – the variance of the distri-
bution – in order to achieve different scales. In practice, it has been noted that, with
this parameterization, we are able to filter out some noise of the image, and are able to
6 The SIFT algorithm uses difference of Gaussians at different scales (i.e S(x, y, kσ) −
S(x, y, σ)); for more information see previous work by Lowe [22].
detect extrema of varying sizes. To get both large and small-sized extrema, we observe
the image at a range of scales. Each of the scale ranges is then called an octave, and,
after an octave has been calculated, we down-sample the image by a factor of two and
observe another octave. In the left images of Fig. 12, we show the result of applying
the Gaussian kernel to a traffic light. It is clear that this blurring removes some of the
unnecessary details within the image and leaves some of the larger features to be exam-
ined. After the calculation of a scale space range for each octave, Lowe detects extrema
by observing the neighbors of a three by three kernel. If a pixel value is larger or smaller
than its neighbors in successive scales, then it is marked as a ”keypoint” (as shown in
the right portion of Fig. 12).
Fig. 12: Demonstration of Gaussian blur effect to generate scale. Far right: figure from
[23] shows how extrema are detected from these scaled images. Black ’x’ marks an
extremum if it is larger or smaller than all of the pixels around it.
Importantly, detection of extrema by this method has been shown to be invariant
to changes in translation, scaling and rotation, and is minimally affected by noise and
small distortions [22]. For our algorithm this means that we should be able to detect and
manipulate salient features of images even when the image is of low quality.
Keypoint Description After scale-space extrema have been detected, they are located
in the original image. Initially, in [23], this localization was done by translating the
pixel location from the scale and octave onto the original image; however, this was
later improved by using the Taylor expansion of the scale space function shifted so that
the origin is at the sampled point. Regardless of which of these is used, the first step
of keypoint description is to assign the exact x and y coordinates of the extrema in
the image. Once the extrema have been described with a location we refer to them as
keypoints in a set Λ where each keypoint λ ∈ Λ has an x and y coordinate, λx and λy ,
respectively.
After localizing these keypoints, we describe their size and orientation. Size is cal-
culated by the magnitude of the gradient vector corresponding to the keypoint which
was located; we will denote the size as λs. After size has been calculated, we sample
pixel values from different areas around the keypoint to generate descriptors. The imple-
mentation of SIFT in [7] (used by our algorithms) gives 128 different local descriptors
for each keypoint, which include size, response strength, orientation angle, and local
gradient magnitudes. The response strength of keypoints, λr, which is derived from
the persistence of a keypoint across multiple octaves and scales, is important for our
formulation of a salience distribution.
Fig. 13: Locating, describing and matching keypoints across the image. Blue circles are
keypoints, while green lines represent a few selected keypoints which are persistent
throughout each image size.
E Intuition for Using Feature Detection for Safety Testing
It is reasonable to assume that, if any visual system mistakes the classification of an
object, then both the spatial and compositional elements of the image must have played
an important role. In artificial visual systems, this mapping between an image’s basic
elements and its classification is systematically learned; however, the ability to know if
a system has truly understood the relation between an image’s composition or structure
and its classification is difficult, and the advent of adversarial examples suggests that
artificial visual systems are very sensitive to perturbations of these elements.
To test this hypothesis – that an artificial visual system is very sensitive to changes
in structural or compositional elements – we need to be able to pinpoint and manipulate
the most important aspects of such elements.
Over the years, many artificial visual systems have been proposed with varying
degrees of success. Modern convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are hypothesized
to model the primary visual cortex of humans and primates. The success of modern
networks in addition to observations of their hidden layers has been cited as support for
this hypothesis. Prior to the success of CNNs, feature detection was completed by using
methods such as the Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) algorithm.
The methods by which SIFT computes features is not only deterministic, but well
understood as a reliable way to identify basic structural and compositional elements
of an image, albeit it may be difficult or expensive to transform this identification to
an understanding of an image’s classification. CNNs, on the other hand, are able to
successfully understand the mapping between an image and it’s classification – but how
much of that relationship is dependent on basic structural and compositional elements
is unknown. Adversarial examples show that minor changes to such elements can be
catastrophic.
Fig. 14: Illustration of the transformation of an image into a saliency distribution. (a)
The original image, provided by ImageNet. (b) The image marked with relevant key-
points. (c) The weighting of keypoints by their response strength, where the weights are
sorted in order to show the range and distribution of probabilities. (d) An illustration of
the probability distribution after observing one million samples.
Given the opposing strengths of SIFT and CNNs, it seemed natural to explore the
relationship between deterministic feature detection of SIFT and automatic, stochastic
feature detection of CNNs.
In Fig. 14 we illustrate an image’s transformation into a saliency distribution. While
it is intuitive that these two intimately related algorithms have some common ground, it
would not be prudent to assume that the feature detection performed by SIFT and by all
CNNs is identical. As such, we introduced Monte Carlo saliency updating and MCTS
algorithms to actively re-weight the distribution components based on what we are able
to glean from querying the CNN model. Constantly updating the saliency distribution –
see Fig. 14(d) – based on the impact of the feature’s manipulation wrt the CNN model
allows us to dynamically bridge the gap between deterministic and stochastic feature
detection (SIFT and CNNs respectively). Further, we can see that, when we allow for
the salience distribution to evolve towards a particular target classification, the network
weights different keypoints of the image.
Though in Fig. 15 the differences in saliency distributions are subtle, they are also
crucial. Flexible saliency distributions are needed to find and manipulate the most cru-
cial elements of an image. For example, a set of ideally placed white pixels can cause
the network to believe that a structural element is present where it clearly is not. Sim-
ilarly, a set of ideally placed pixels can disguise key elements which may lead to a
misclassification. In either event, one thing seems certain: the key structural and com-
positional elements are the heart of any visual system. SIFT provides reliable means to
pinpoint these elements, which we exploit in our approach.
Fig. 15: Illustration of the evolution of a saliency distribution with different target
classes. Each of the above images was the result of a single, target Monte Carlo sim-
ulation with no refinement procedure for illustrative purposes. (a) Modified to Crane
with 57.6% confidence after 572 pixel changes. (b) Modified to Fountain with 48.2%
confidence after 2172 pixel changes. (c) Modified to Castle with 20.4% confidence af-
ter 2553 pixel changes. (d) Modified to Bell with 27.3% confidence after 1895 pixel
changes.
Compared to CNNs, SIFT is fast but does not generalise; we do not rely on the latter
aspect in our approach.
F Information about The Nexar Challenge Network
The retraining of the Nexar network [8] – whose architecture and hyper-parameters are
detailed in Table 5 – can be achieved by executing the script found in the Examples
directory of the SafeCV package. Below we give the training details of the network
tested in this paper.
G Overview of the Monte Carlo Tree Search Algorithm
In this section we present a more detailed explanation of the Monte Carlo Tree Search
(MCTS) and offer parallels with the game representation of crafting adversarial exam-
ples. More detailed information on this method and its origination can be found in [17]
and [10]. Throughout this section we will explain the tree search mechanism first, and
then we will reinforce this by recalling the two-player game representation.
The tree representation is such that each α′ that can be reached by one manipulation
of α is on the first level, two manipulations of α on the second level, and so on. Further,
each node has children that represent the manipulation of a particular pixel. In the game,
a path from the root to a leaf would be modeled with the sequence s1u1s2u2... of game
Fig. 16: Accuracy per epoch during the
training of the winning entry of the
Nexar Challenge [8]; training and test
accuracy peek at around 90% and 87%
respectively.
Fig. 17: Loss per epoch during the
training of the winning entry of the
Nexar Challenge [8].
states such that, for all k ≥ 1, we have uk as a move made by player I (selecting which
keypoint to manipulated) and sk+1 as a move made by player II (selecting a specific
pixel and how to manipulate it). Here, we restrict ourselves to visualizing the moves
made by player I.
During a Monte Carlo tree search, a partial tree of previously explored states is
maintained and the policy for exploring the children of each state is continuously up-
dated. Within the framework of our game, this can be thought of as maintaining a series
of previous game plays and updating the strategies of each player, respectively.
Recall that we utilize SIFT keypoints as a high level representation of the input
which allows an a priori saliency distribution. The components distributions and their
weights will serve as initial exploration policies for players I and II, respectively, and
by extension for exploring the tree. The exploration algorithm is classically split into
four steps: selection, expansion, simulation, and backpropagation.
Fig. 18: The initial tree with α (the original image) as the root of the tree and each
child representing the options of player I (the keypoints of α). We use a green color to
represent ‘leaf’ nodes, blue to represent internal nodes, dotted lines to represent unex-
plored paths, solid lines to represent explored paths, and colors to represent probability
of selection.
G.1 Selection
Choosing a node to explore is straightforward: the weights of the Gaussian mixture
model provide an initial stochastic policy, which we will call φˆ. A distribution derived
from these weights defines the the base strategy for player I. We will cover the update
(or evolution) of this strategy in the section on backpropogation.
After selecting a keypoint, the strategy for selection of a specific pixel, the respon-
sibility of player II, is given by Gi,x and Gi,y . We leave the manipulation function
purposefully vague so as to not limit approaches that might have different optimization
goals.
Fig. 19: The selection of a node from the root depends on the policy. Here, because the
root was previously unexplored this figure not only represents selection but expansion
of the root node.
G.2 Expansion
Once we reach a node that has not yet been explored (that is, one from which we have
not selected before), termed a ‘leaf’ node, we employ the standard exploration strategy,
φˆ, to select a new node (this is visualized in Fig. 19 as the Initial Policy). Because this
child did not previously exist in the tree, this step is known as ‘expansion.’
Prior to continuing the procedure, the termination conditions are checked.
G.3 Simulation
Once we have selected a new leaf node and made the proper manipulation, we employ
Monte Carlo simulation of the manipulation process. That is, we continuously search
the tree until a termination condition is met. During this simulation, we exclusively use
φˆ and do not record the nodes we visit as part of the partial, Monte Carlo tree. This
could be seen as using the default strategies for each player to arrive at a termination
condition.
Fig. 20: Following the expansion of the root, we continue to select nodes down the tree
until a termination condition is satisfied. Note that at each step of the simulation we are
using the initial policy and that we have colored the nodes which are not a part of the
partial tree in purple.
G.4 Backpropagation
Once a termination condition is met, we use the reward function as defined in Section
3. The reward r is then used to update each of the policies in the nodes to the current
leaf based on the upper confidence bound (UCB [17]) equation:
r¯j,l +
√
2ln(n)
nj
where r¯j,l is the mean reward after selecting the jth node on the lth level, n is the
number of times this nodes parent has been played and nj is the number of times this
node has been selected from all the times its parent has been played. It is clear from
inspection that the jth node will have a high confidence bound if the reward of its
selection is consistently high or if it is not selected after its parent has been selected
many times (i.e. n >> nj).
The turn-based game interpretation of this update function is backtracking through
the game play (s1u1s2u2...) and updating each player’s strategy for exploring uk and
sk+1.
(a) After a termination condition has been met, we calculate the reward of the final node (inverse
of severity) and we backpropagate this reward up the tree so that we can update the probabilities
of selection from the root node.
(b) If the adversarial example that was detected required a severe manipulation, then the policy
for exploration from the root might discourage future exploration in that direction.
Fig. 21
Fig. 22: Pedagogical example of asymmetric Monte Carlo tree after a satisfactory ad-
versarial example has been found. We show the detected sequence of manipulations
to the adversarial example outlined in blue with red lines between them, and the fi-
nal adversarial example outlined in red. Note that, though the adversarial example and
the sequence of manipulations are empirical, the tree represented here is contrived for
pedagogical purposes.
H Lk Distance as a Manipulation Severity Metric
In general, accurately quantifying the perceptual similarity between distinct images
remains a problem without a perfect solution. Accurate encapsulation of perceptual
differences is central to any procedure that seeks an optimal (i.e. minimally distinct)
adversarial example. In the absence of a perfect metric for measuring perceptual simi-
larity, the Lk norm has been widely adopted. Unfortunately, no one value of k can be
selected on principle. In this section we describe how changing the parameter k alters
the optimization procedure in the context of finding perceptually minimal examples.
As we can see in Fig. 23, when we speak of the “severity” of a manipulation, it is
imperative that this be thought of in the context of the particular k that has been chosen,
as choosing different k for each image will vary the perceived severity significantly.
For example, selecting small k (e.g. 0 or 1) optimizes for sparse but intense changes to
single pixel values; on the other hand, selecting large k values optimizes for pervasive
but slight changes to pixels the image.
Fig. 23: Comparison of Lk distance metrics. (a) We can get an idea of how intense each
pixel is in the original image. (b) Many pixels manipulated only slightly leads to high
L0 and low L∞. (c) Half the pixels manipulated in (b) but each pixel disturbed more
from its original value leads to lowerL0 thanL∞. (d) Manipulating fewer values than in
(b) but more than (a) and with an intermediate intensity change exacerbates the distance
between L0 and L1.
I Extension to General Purpose Deep Neural Networks
The methods presented in this paper focus on the image domain, a mature application
of neural networks (and one that has been proposed for safety and security-critical ap-
plications). In this section, we describe how a similar approach could be used to test
neural networks with more diverse inputs.
Given a network, and a way to semantically partition that input dimensions into
subsets (used as substitutes for keypoints), one can apply the method described in this
paper. Using any regular partition of the dimensions of the input data will allow for the
algorithm to evolve the saliency values to arrive at a coarse-grained approximation of
features in the input.
This points to the issue of how to assign initial weights in order to accurately en-
capsulate saliency. One advantage to the MCTS algorithm is that it will actively learn
saliency even if it is supplied with a random distribution (though this will slow down
convergence to an optimal strategy). Often, however, it is the case that machine learning
practitioners have some domain knowledge that will allow for an a priori assignment
of saliency, even if that assignment is a very rough estimate.
